Thesis
This paper's genesis was driven by the question: Is Al Qaeda's operational center of gravity, as hard to find as the terrorists themselves? The question is derived from the author's interests in two areas: the first, a long term interest in center of gravity concepts; and second, since the 11 September 2001 World Trade Center attack, a professional interest in the most effective ways and means for eliminating Al Qaeda from the world's stage. Thus, this paper's generating base is the author's interests, but also the perceived requirement for military forces needing the correct enemy operational center of gravity before planning and executing operations against it. Therefore, the thesis: Al Qaeda's operational center of gravity is correctly identifiable by using operational warfare's principles and processes.
The Strategic Adversary and Its Strategic Objective
Currently, the United States is engaged in an undeclared war against radical Wahhabi Islamic terrorist groups across diplomatic, informational, military, and economic fronts. In the words of President Bush, "We're at war. There has been an act of war declared upon America by terrorists, and we will respond accordingly."
i Albeit, from a conventional view, diplomatic, informational, military, and economic forces are classified as a nation's elements of power, and contextually examined in that light when the state's strategic leadership, considers action or reaction in relation to other states. ii However, in this war, the United States' strategic leadership must take a nonclassical and unconventional view of all radical Wahhabi Islamic terrorist groups, considering them as the single strategic adversary.
With these groups viewed as one entity, and labeled for purposes of this paper as the Adversary, friendly forces execute operations against enemy forces in the same manner as they do against any other nation state with which conflicts occur: operations based upon objectives derived from a national strategic objective. Thus, clarity of purpose reigns, operational templates remain in place, and only techniques, tactics, and procedures require adjustment when facing differing enemy operational and tactical forces. Even though many factions, all with their own agendas and objectives may well make up what is termed above as the enemy, the author believes by treating this strategic enemy as a state, one merely lacking physical territory, makes it easier for the United States in conducting this war. Finally, by viewing the Adversary as a state, its strategic center of gravity becomes, "will of the people," although it is more precisely, Wahhabism's extreme Islamic fundamentalism.
Admittedly, few analysts consider the myriad of radical or fundamentalist Islamic groups as having a monolithic world view, iii but the Adversary's Wahhabi beliefs, "argue for a world in which saved, purified Muslims will have no contact with Christians, Jews, and non-Wahhabi There are four main advantages accruing to the United States by combining various radical Islamic groups into one Adversary. First, given a single strategic enemy and its objective, makes the task of determining the United States' national strategic objective easier for the nation's political leaders. Second, once determined, the national strategic objective provides clarity of national purpose, galvanizes the will of the people, prepares them for the requisite sacrifices in the war's successful prosecution, and secures their support for the war. Third, the task of determining the theater strategic and operational objective against a single enemy is less complex for the nation's military leaders than multiple theater strategic and operational objectives being the case.
Last, planning and conducting the campaigns, major operation, or just a single battle in achieving objectives at the various levels of war are simpler given one strategic enemy versus many. This is especially true for the operational level commander, Commander of the Joint Task Force (CJTF), as explained below.
In planning and executing campaigns against the Adversary's operational forces, the CJTF tailors his forces specifically for the fight, conducting operations in the same manner against subadversaries as he would against conventional foes. In short, the CJTF makes time, space, and force factors work to his advantage, employing greater resources against the enemy's lesser resources, maintaining initiative and momentum across the operational spectrum, defeating the enemy in enemy territory, all within the CJTF's timeline. Importantly, the initiative slips away from the enemy as soon as JTF units deploy into the area of operations, and pressured into planning defenses against JTF attacks instead of attacking targets outside their territory, the enemy quickly loses its operational momentum. More importantly, by constantly leveraging greater JTF technological capabilities, superior technology is a friendly force strength and an enemy force weakness. This is especially true given that the Adversary's forces lack their own technology.
Victor Davis Hanson explains:
"The Taliban and their supporters in the Middle East, like the Ottomans of old, are, to put it plainly, parasitic on Western civilization. A bin Laden can kill Americans only through terror, stealth, Western technology, and familiarity with American culture. Cell phones, the Internet, frequent-flier miles, and Boeing 767 pilot lessons are not indigenous to the to the Middle East." xii Finally, two other significant weaknesses plague the enemy, one internal and one external.
The Adversary's significant internal weakness is that its strategic objective is based solely on its religious ideal, Wahhabism. In the same manner as a conventional state, it seeks attainment of its strategic objective through the ways and means best suited in bringing about that end. The mission of the operational artist is translating the national strategic to the operational objective, and then discerning those requirements that must be accomplished at the operational level in attainment of the political objective. To do this, the operational planner: first, takes the given political or theater strategic objective and derives the required operational objective; second, taking the operational objective and after analyzing the enemy's critical strengths, he derives the corresponding center of gravity required for achieving that operational objective; and third, by determining the right mixture of national power sources required in defeating or neutralizing the enemy's center of gravity, thereby achieves that operational objective through planning and execution of operational campaigns.
Thus, the correct linkage of strategic to operational objective, along with the correct mix of national power sources against the corresponding center of gravity, leads to operational success.
Operational success, in turn, leads to strategic success, as long as, those objectives are both correctly identified and linked at the planning sequence's start. Conversely, if linkage is absent from the operational to the strategic objective, and/or there is incorrect mix of national power sources applied in pursuing that objective, one may be unsuccessful at one or both levels of war.
Additionally, if objectives are incorrectly identified, one faces a grave risk of achieving operational success but failing strategic success, or worse yet, failing objective attainment at both levels of war.
A nation experiencing operational success without strategic success, or failures at both levels of war, faces a failure of national will, its national strategic center of gravity. If this nation experiences failure of will, it is open to defeat, regardless of its strengths and Adversary's weaknesses. Illustrating the above in relation to the nation's strategic failure in Vietnam, Harry G.
Summers writes, "'You know you never defeated us on the battlefield,' said the American colonel.
The North Vietnamese colonel pondered this remark for a moment. 'That may be so,' he replied, 'but it is also irrelevant.'" "A common error is to confuse operational objectives with the corresponding center of gravity. The result is a flawed plan that leads to the wastes of resources and time, even when one's forces enjoy superiority over the enemy forces. Focus on the objectives instead of on the enemy's operational center of gravity will invariably result in unnecessary losses in personnel, materiel, and time." xix In the war against the Adversary, defeating its operational forces (terrorist groups) is the key to the United States' strategic victory. Therefore, the operational artist must correctly select the operational objective and its corresponding center of gravity for that operational force. The following illustration demonstrates operational warfare's initial and essential steps in determining the objective and correct identification of Al Qaeda's center of gravity.
Al Qaeda's Operational Center of Gravity
Al Qaeda, translated is, "the base." xx Originally and literally, "the base" was merely Osama for a myriad of reasons and perceptions falling onto the continuum between religion and politics, with significant cultural influences falling in between, Al Qaeda conducts operations against the West to achieve its stated objective.
In pursuit of its operational objective, Al Qaeda's "means" to its "end" is terrorism. Significantly, the name "Osama," is the second most popular name for male infants in the Muslim world, right after Mohammed.
lxviii At this juncture, having both the operational objective and, based on that objective, Al
Qaeda's critical strengths, the next step is determining the center of gravity. Further, since center of gravity is only derived from critical strengths, lxix determination of Al Qaeda's center of gravity must derive from advanced communications, information technology, legal and illegal financial networks and organization, its leader, or a combination of the above.
One obvious factor stands out among the above critical strengths: even though information technology and advanced communication are critical strengths of Al Qaeda, they are distinctly subject to direct and indirect attack. Moreover, upon closer examination, looking at these two critical strengths in composite, one is justified in making the operational leap that there are implied capabilities additive to these two strengths, making them more of a "system" than just a satellite phone or a computer work station.
Additionally, Al Qaeda is well known for its use of advanced information technology, so it is probable that this system also interfaces, in some degree, with its finance and logistic organization and elements, along the lines of the U.S. military's planned Global Command Support System (GCSS), although probably not to that level of sophistication. However, for this paper, this system is labeled, "C2F," for "Command and Control and Finance (Logistics) System." lxx Further, C2F appears as the best Al Qaeda's center of gravity candidate. Therefore, the next step in this center of gravity determination is validation or invalidation.
In identifying C2F as Al Qaeda's center of gravity, one uses a center of gravity definition and a logical methodology in the validation process. In this case, although there are many center of gravity definitions, Vego's from Operational Warfare is the best modern definition. So, "That source of massed strength-physical or moral, or a source of leverage-whose serious degradation, dislocation, neutralization, or destruction would have the most decisive impact on the enemy's or one's own ability to accomplish a given military objective," lxxi serves as the first element of the validation process.
As for the second element required in the validation process, a logical methodology, the method postulated by William W. Mendel and Lamar Tooke, is best:
"If I desire to impose my will upon this center of gravity, will that action create a cascading, deteriorating effect on morale, cohesion, and will to fight that prevents my enemy from achieving his aims and allows the achievement of my own? Further, if I have selected a valid center of gravity, do I have a feasible ability to impose my will over it?" lxxii The authors continue, "If the answer to both questions is yes, then a valid center of gravity has been established." lxxiii With regard to C2F, the answer to both validation questions is in the affirmative, and therefore, C2F is confirmed as Al Qaeda's center of gravity.
The following is supporting rationale for C2F being Al Qaeda's center of gravity. First, by using advanced information technology, C2F provides not just command, control, and operational Mendel and Tooke's methodology. It is not "leadership" because if Osama bin Laden is killed or captured, another leader will take his place, and speculation exists today that this may already be the case. Incorporated into the identified center of gravity, is Al Qaeda's legal and illegal financial enterprise network, because with C2F's degradation, defeat or destruction, the finances and what they buy, is neutralized. Finally, as to "classical" centers of gravity, as historically identified: it is not Al Qaeda's "forces" because they are too weak to attack with any means other than terrorism and the massing of those effects; it is not "capitol" because Al Qaeda is neither a nation or a state, with no territory nor capitol; it is not "will of the people," because that is strategic and Al Qaeda is an operational entity, a sub-adversary, as defined in this paper. Thus, C2F is Al Qaeda's operational center of gravity.
CONCLUSIONS
Two questions and their answers: First, in answer to this paper's title question, Is Al Qaeda's operational center of gravity, as hard to find as the terrorists themselves? The answer is, "no." In fact, finding it was not difficult, only time consuming and analysis intensive, just as with nearly every center of gravity identification in this author's experience over the past dozen years.
Second, was the paper's thesis supported? The answer is, "yes." Al Qaeda's operational center of gravity is correctly identifiable by using operational warfare principles and processes. Admittedly, during the early research phase of this paper, there was concern given that Al Qaeda, being a terrorist network and neither a truly conventional or unconventional force by common definition, might prove troublesome. It did not.
This author believes the reason for the above answers is simply because the principles and processes of operational warfare, or operational art, are viable for any opponent with which the nation finds itself at odds. Further, they have stood the test of time, and will continue doing so as long as operational artists continue updating and improving the process, thus far the standard.
Finally, in the author's view, it does not matter if it is a conventional or unconventional foe, operating symmetrically or asymmetrically, using joint forces or single service forces, operational warfare processes work the entire length of conflict's continuum and at each level of war. If an opponent has even one critical strength, and they all possess at least one, then there is a center of gravity. However, even if they all have a center of gravity, and its determination process has stood "What is our center of gravity? How do we protect it?" Most importantly, "How do we preclude failure of the national will?" Last point. This terrorism war forces this nation's leaders, its institutions, and its people to study this conflict far more differently than any other in the national experience. There have been hot wars and cold wars, but this is a "lukewarm" war, with challenges and characteristics from both converging with new and unresolved factors, resulting in a war where old rules do not always work. Perhaps center of gravity identification remains "easy," but plans and actions based on that "easy" information, only become tougher to determine. 
